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Abstract
Part I of this Note explores the background of both the Guantánamo detainee problem-i.e.,
what rights a foreign national detained at Guantánamo has-and the domestic detainee problemi.e., what rights a foreign national detained on US soil has-that the United States may soon be
facing, as well as the development of the law that has left open these legal ambiguities. Part I also
discusses the applicability of international law on the issue. Part II presents the current conflict
over the rights foreign detainees should have and the legality of detention on US soil, discusses the
applicability of international law within the United States on the issue, and presents the two trial
options for foreign detainees in the United States: the civilian criminal justice system and military
commissions. Part II also discusses recent events that give a richer dimension to the debate on
these issues, as well as recent proposals made by members of Congress for handling the detention
and trial of foreign nationals on US soil. Part III argues that a system of military detention and
trial before a military commission for foreign detainees on US soil is both legal and proper under
the jurisprudence that has developed after September 11. Due to the perceived difficulties posed
by trying, in US federal criminal court, a foreign national detained in the “war on terror.” Part
III asserts that these detainees should be placed into military custody and tried before a military
commission unless a civilian criminal trial is feasible. Pending charges, judicial review of a foreign
national’s detention consistent with the US Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush is
arguably all that is required as long as the detainee may legally be held under the laws of war.

AFTER GUANTANAMO: LEGAL RIGHTS OF
FOREIGN DETAINEES HELD IN THE UNITED
STATES IN THE "WAR ON TERROR"
Ashley C. Pope *
INTRODUCTION
Much of the discussion of how to address foreign detainees
has revolved around those detained at Guantinamo Bay.' With
US President Barack Obama's promised closure of the
Guantdnamo Bay detention center more than two years ago, it
was thought that many of those detainees could potentially be
moved to the United States.2 While some would have been moved
in order to face prosecution,3 it was likely that others would have
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1. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that Guantinamo
detainees have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557 (2006) (rejecting military commissions' authority, as constituted, to try
GuantAnamo detainees); see also Benjamin Wittes & Robert Chesney, The Courts' Shifting
Rules on GuantanamoDetainees,WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2010, at A17 (discussing the conflict
of rules and ideas among district court judges in GuantAnamo habeas cases).
2. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009) (ordering the
closure of the Guantdnamo Bay detention facilities); Mark Mazzetti & William
Glaberson, Obama Issues Directive to Shut Down Guantdnamo,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at
Al; Charlie Savage, Plan to Move Guantdnamo Detainees Faces New Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 2009, at Al (noting obstacles in the way of a plan to move GuantAnamo detainees to
the United States); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Would Move Some Detainees to U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, May 22, 2009, at Al (discussing the potential for GuantAnamo detainees to be
moved to the United States).
3. See Steve Holland, U.S. to Move Some Guantanamo Prisoners to Illinois, REUTERS,
Dec. 15, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1519709020091215
(stating that the Obama administration planned to move Guantinamo detainees to a US
prison and hold military commissions trials there); see also Charlie Savage & Scott Shane,
Experts Urge Keeping Two Options for Terror Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2010, at Al5
(discussing Senator Lindsey Graham's proposal to clarify rules for handling detainees
and their trials).
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been transferred to the United States in order to continue their
detention.4 In December 2010, the US Congress passed a
spending bill prohibiting the use of Department of Defense
funds for the transfer of Guantlinamo detainees to the United
States, even for prosecution. The bill also banned the use of
such funds to construct or modify existing facilities to hold
Guantinamo detainees in military custody on US soil.' President
Obama, despite strong objections regarding the bill's effects and
its limitation on executive authority, signed the bill into law on
January 7, 2011.7 He has pledged, however, to seek the repeal of
the act's restrictions and opposes any extension or expansion of
the restrictions in the future.' The transfer of foreign detainees
4. See Anna Mulrine, Obama Decision to Move GuantanamoDetainees Spurs Opposition,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2009/
12/23/obama-decision-to-move-guantanamo-detainees-spurs-opposition.html
(discussing criticism of President Obama's plan to move GuantAnamo detainees to the
United States on the grounds that the plan could mean that detainees would be held in
the United States indefinitely); see also Holland, supra note 3 (stating that Democrats
were planning to lift a restriction on bringing GuantAnamo detainees into the United
States for purposes other than prosecution if the Obama administration offered an
acceptable plan).
5. See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L.
No. 111-383, § 1302, 124 Stat. 4137, 4406 (2011); see also Charlie Savage, Vote Hurts
Obama's Push to Empty Cuba Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2010, at A24 (stating that the bill
passed by Congress bans the transfer of any GuantAnamo detainee into the United States
using the bill's funds).
6. See Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 § 1304,
124 Stat. 4137, 4406.
7. See President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on H.R. 6523 (Jan. 7,
2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/07/statementpresident-hr-6523 (stating that, despite his strong objections to sections 1302 and 1303,
President Obama signed the Act because of its importance to funding military activities).
8. See id. ("[M]y Administration will work with Congress to seek repeal of these
restrictions, will seek to mitigate their effects, and will oppose any attempt to extend or
expand them in the future."); see also Charlie Savage, New Measure to Hinder Closing of
Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at All (discussing President Obama's plan to urge
Congress to repeal the Act's restrictions in the coming months after signing the Act).
The Obama administration has already questioned the legality of these provisions of the
Act. See Statement by the President on H.R 6523, supra note 7 (warning that section
1032 of the Act "represents a dangerous and unprecedented challenge to critical
executive branch authority"); Letter from Eric Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to Harry
Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, & Mitch McConnell, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate
(Dec. 9, 2010) available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/nytdocs/docs/537/537.pdf
(communicating his opposition to the corresponding section in the Senate version of
the bill, writing that "[tihis provision goes well beyond existing law and would unwisely
restrict the ability of the Executive branch to prosecute alleged terrorists in Federal
courts or military commissions in the United States as well as its ability to incarcerate
those individuals convicted in such tribunals.").
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to the United States, should it become an option again, may
change the rights to which detainees are entitled, and the fact
that foreign detainees are on US soil may or may not require that
they be placed in the civilian criminal justice system.
This Note explores whether the current procedures for the
detention of foreign nationals at GuantAnamo Bay apply on US
soil and how the US legal system would absorb foreign nationals
detained solely in the United States.9 Much of the law governing
detention and trial in the "war on terror" focuses on
GuantAnamo detainees. 10 Given the small number of foreign
"war-on-terror" detainees currently in the United States," it is
first necessary to evaluate detainees' rights, as they have been
established, by examining the law applicable to detainees at
GuantAnamo. This Note addresses the lawfulness of military
detention,1 2 habeas corpus review of detention,13 and the legality
of and procedures for trial before a military commission as well
as in federal criminal court. 4
Part I of this Note explores the background of both the
GuantAnamo detainee problem-i.e., what rights a foreign
national detained at Guantinamo has-and the domestic
detainee problem-i.e., what rights a foreign national detained
on US soil has-that the United States may soon be facing, as
9. See Holland, supra note 3 (discussing the potential for a change in law that would
allow Guantinamo detainees to be brought to the United States even if they are not to
be prosecuted); see also Mulrine, supra note 4 (questioning the federal government's
authority to hold Guantinamo detainees indefinitely on US soil).
10. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (giving Guantinamo
detainees the right to petition for habeas corpus); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006) (rejecting the use of military commissions convened by the executive branch to
prosecute a GuantAnamo detainee); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding
that a US citizen who was initially held at GuantAnamo but then transferred to the
United States could be detained but must be given the right to challenge his detention).
11. In 2009, the US Congress passed laws preventing the transfer of Guantdnamo
detainees to the United States except for prosecution purposes. See Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 552, 123 Stat. 2142
(2009); see also Helene Cooper & David Johnston, Obama Tells Prison to Take Detainees,
N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 2009, at A27 (stating that Congress has barred the transfer of
GuantAnamo detainees to US soil with an exception for transfer for prosecution). More
recently, Congress has barred the transfer of GuantAnamo detainees for any purpose. See
Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111383, § 1302, 124 Stat. 4137, 4406 (2011).
12. See discussion infra Parts I.B, II.A.
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.
14. See discussion infra Parts I.C, II.C. This Note does not seek to address indefinite
detention.
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well as the development of the law that has left open these legal
ambiguities. Part I also discusses the applicability of international
law on the issue. Part II presents the current conflict over the
rights foreign detainees should have and the legality of detention
on US soil, discusses the applicability of international law within
the United States on the issue, and presents the two trial options
for foreign detainees in the United States: the civilian criminal
justice system and military commissions. Part II also discusses
recent events that give a richer dimension to the debate on these
issues, as well as recent proposals made by members of Congress
for handling the detention and trial of foreign nationals on US
soil. Part III argues that a system of military detention and trial
before a military commission for foreign detainees on US soil is
both legal and proper under the jurisprudence that has
developed after September 11. Due to the perceived difficulties
posed by trying, in US federal criminal court, a foreign national
detained in the "war on terror."" Part III asserts that these
detainees should be placed into military custody and tried before
a military commission unless a civilian criminal trial is feasible.
Pending charges, judicial review of a foreign national's detention
consistent with the US Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene v.
Bush is arguably all that is required as long as the detainee may
legally be held under the laws of war.

I.

REACTING TO SEPTEMBER 11

Before evaluating the question of military detention and
trial of "war-on-terror" detainees on US soil, some background is
necessary. Most of the jurisprudence that informs a discussion of
this question has arisen out of the challenges posed by holding
and trying the foreign nationals detained at GuantAnamo, and,
therefore, it is necessary to look to the history and law that has
been established because of that facility's existence. This Part
endeavors to provide a background to the legal issues
surrounding detention and trial in the "war on terror." Section A
provides a brief history of the September 11 attacks and the
United States' reaction, including the establishment of the
detention center at GuantAnamo Bay. Section B examines
15. While GuantAnamo detainees currently cannot be transferred to the United
States to face prosecution, the law in this area has changed frequently. See supranotes 38 and accompanying text.
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sources that provide authority for military detention outside the
United States, including the US Constitution, domestic
legislation, US court opinions, and international law, Finally,
Section C briefly evaluates authorization for the use of military
commissions abroad.' 6
A.

September 11, the "War on Terror," and the Legal Hotbed of
GuantdnamoBay

On September 11, 2001, terrorists acting under the
direction and planning of Al Qaeda hijacked commercial jets and
attacked both the World Trade Center in New York and the
Pentagon in Washington, DC, killing thousands of people.17 One
week later, Congress passed the 2001 Authorization for Use of
Military Force ("AUMF"), a joint resolution giving the President
broad power to use "all necessary and appropriate force" against
those who were responsible for or aided those responsible for the
September 11 attacks.18 With this authorization, President
George W. Bush declared a "war on terror" and sent US armed
forces to Afghanistan to combat both Al Qaeda and the Taliban,
which was suspected of supporting Al Qaeda.19 In the subsequent
hostilities, which are ongoing, hundreds of foreign nationals
were detained as suspected terrorists and transferred to US
detention facilities at Guantdnamo Bay.20
The detention of foreign nationals at Guantinamo Bay
quickly became a source of international controversy, and the
legal issues surrounding detention at that facility have been
debated at length.2 1 While "war-on-terror" detainees have
16. See infra Part II.C for further discussion of military commissions.
17. 'A National Tragedy; Terrorism Hits New York and Washington, WASH. POST, Sept.

12, 2001, at C16; see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004); see also Haidan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567-68 (2006).
18. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001); see also infra Part I.B.
19. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.
gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html ("Our war on terror begins with al
Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global
reach has been found, stopped and defeated."); see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 568; Hamdi,
542 U.S. at 510.
20. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 568.
21. See Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: Captives; Rumsfeld Defends
Treatment by U.S. of Cuba Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2002, at A9 (discussing
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historically been held outside the United States, the need to
detain foreign nationals on US soil will inevitably arise if the
United States continues to be a target for terrorist attacks,
whether that need comes from the transfer of those held at
Guantinamo or from the detention of those caught in the act.2 2
B.

Sources of Authority for Military Detention: Guantanamoand
Abroad

The federal government's authority to detain foreign
nationals in the "war on terror" comes from a variety of sources,
including the US Constitution, statutes, and US Supreme Court
precedent, and international law. The narrower question of
whether the US government may detain a foreign national in the
United States remains unresolved, though it seems that the
government would have detention authority in the United
States.2 3
1. The US Constitution
While not binding law, the preamble to the US Constitution
is informative and sets the tone for a discussion of the lawfulness
of military detention. It reads, "We the people of the United
States, in order ...

to provide for the common defense ...

do

ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America."24 Since its founding, the defense of the nation and its
people has been an important concern. That "the common
defense" is named as one of only six purposes for which the US
Constitution was established highlights the importance of
national defense to the laws and ideals of the United States.2 5
international criticism of the treatment of prisoners); see also Katharine Q. Seelye &
David Sanger, Bush Reconsiders Stand on Treating Captives of War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2002, at Al4 ("Critics contend that the United States is fudging the definition of war to
suit its political purposes.").
22. The so-called Christmas Day Bomber is an example of the need to detain on US
soil. See infra Part II.E. 1.
23. See discussion infra Part H.A.

24. U.S. CONsT. pmbl.
25. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 958-59 (1988)
("Thus, national defense would seem to have impeccable credentials as a compelling
governmental interest despite the lack of specific textual injunction beyond the general
language of the preamble."); see also Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to
Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REv. 663, 674 (2004) ("Thus, as we assess questions of civil liberty it
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Under the Constitution, Congress has the power to provide
for the common defense of the United States; define and punish
offenses against the law of nations; declare war; raise and support
armies; provide and maintain a navy; make rules for the
government and regulation of the armed forces; and make all
laws necessary and proper for carrying out its Article I, Section 8
powers and all powers vested by the US Constitution in the
federal government.
Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 establishes that the president is
the commander in chief of American armed forces when called
into service.26 While Congress has the power to declare war, the
executive branch directs the armed forces. The George W. Bush
administration maintained that it had plenary authority to detain
enemy combatants under Article II of the US Constitution.27 The
US Supreme Court, however, has not addressed this question in a
majority or plurality opinion.28 Lower court judges have
evaluated, to some extent, the scope of the president's inherent
Article II powers, but, while they acknowledge that the president
has some inherent Article II authority, they are unresolved as to
whether the ability to effect military detention of suspected
terrorists is authorized by that authority.29 The Obama

is important that we not lose sight of the underlying end of government-personal and
national security.").
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
27. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) ("The Government maintains
that no explicit congressional authorization is required, because the Executive possesses
plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the Constitution.").
28. See id. ("We do not reach the question whether Article II provides such
authority."). But see id. at 579-82 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the US
Constitution vests unitary detention authority in the President but agreeing with the
opinion of the Court that the question need not be reached because Congress
authorized such detentions with the AUMF); id. at 568-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(reconciling the proposition that the President lacks indefinite detention authority over
citizens with the Founders' mistrust of permanent executive military power).
29. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 326 (4th Cir. 2008) (5-4 decision
en banc) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) ("It is widely accepted
that the President has some inherent constitutional powers particularly to act in times of
emergency when large numbers of American lives may be at stake."), vacated as moot sub
nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009); AI-Mard, 534 F.3d at 288 (Williams, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part) ("The President .. . already has some inherent
Article II power to wage war.").
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administration, however, does not assert an Article II claim of
authority for military detention.30
The president also has the power and the duty to see that
the laws are "faithfully executed."3 1 This constitutional duty
allows the president to execute laws that Congress passes
governing the detention of suspected terrorists. 32 While the
Constitution may give the president Article II authority as
commander in chief to detain,33 US courts typically have looked
for congressional authorization when evaluating detention
authority. 34
2.

Congressional Authorization

Analysis of the government's authority to effect military
detention of suspected terrorists centers on the AUMF. Seven
days after the September 11 attacks, Congress passed the AUMF,
a joint resolution authorizing the use of the US armed forces
against those responsible for the September 11 attacks.3 5 The
AUMF also explicitly authorizes the president to take action to
deter and prevent terrorist attacks on the United States.3 6 In the
AUMF, Congress stated that it found that acts of "treacherous

30. See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 n.1 (D.D.C. 2009)
("Although the government has previously asserted that petitioners' detentions are
justified, at least in part, by the President's Article II powers as Commander in Chief...,
it no longer makes such an assertion."); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 n.4
(D.C. Cir. 2009) ("Under the Bush administration, the government had repeatedly
asserted that it could detain individuals pursuant to the President's authority as
Commander in Chief under Article II, § 2, clause 1 of the Constitution.... These
contentions are absent from the government's most recent memorandum of law.").
31. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
32. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942) ("The Constitution thus invests the
President, as Commander in Chief, with the power to wage war which Congress has
declared, and to carry into effect all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of war and
for the government and regulation of the Armed Forces, and all laws defining and
punishing offenses against the law of nations, including those which pertain to the
conduct of war.").
33. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (discussing Article II authority).
34. See infra Part I.B.2.
35. Specifically, the AUMF authorizes the President to use "all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the [September 11 attacks], or harbored such
organizations or persons in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons." Authorization for
Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
36. Id.
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violence" such as the September 11 attacks continued to pose
"an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and
foreign policy" of the United States.3 7 The AUMF has provided
the necessary framework for US courts to analyze the legality of
military detention, which requires that the United States be at
war.38
3. Judicial Deference to the Political Branches
While the US Constitution and the laws enacted by Congress
govern this issue, US courts make the final determination. The
US Supreme Court has spoken, to a limited extent, on the issue
of detention authority, and lower courts have been left to refine
the doctrine.3 9 The Supreme Court has chosen not to address the
question of whether Article II of the US Constitution authorizes
the military detention of suspected terrorists because it has found
that the AUMF authorizes such detention.4
The US Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld held that,
under the very narrow circumstances in that case, the AUMF
authorized the military detention of a US citizen who, it was
alleged, had taken up arms with the Taliban in Afghanistan. 41 In
its cases since Hamdi, the Court has bypassed the issue of the
government's authority to detain.4 2 Instead, the Court has left the
question to district courts to decide when hearing detainees'
habeas corpus claims. 43
37. Id.
38. See discussion infra Part .B.3.
39. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516-17 (2004) (holding that the AUMF
authorized the battlefield detention of a US citizen); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 733 (2008) (leaving the issue of the President's detention authority for lower
courts to decide).
40. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-17 ("We do not reach the question whether Article
II provides such [detention] authority, however, because we agree with the
Government's alternative position, that Congress has in fact authorized Hamdi's
detention through the AUMF."). The Obama administration has also chosen not to
claim Article II as authorization for its detention power. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F.
Supp. 2d 63, 66 n.2 (D.D.C. 2009).
41. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 ("We hold that ... Congress authorized the detention
of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged here.").
42. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733 ("We do not address whether the President has
authority to detain these petitioners."); see also Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 67 ("Since
Hamdiwas decided, the Supreme Court has not revisited this question.").
43. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733 ("These and other questions regarding the
legality of the detention are to be resolved in the first instance by the District Court.").
Since the US Supreme Court held in Boumediene that district courts could hear habeas
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The Obama administration claims that the president has the
authority to detain "persons that the president determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the [September 11
attacks], and persons who harbored those responsible for those
attacks."44 President Obama also claims that he has the authority
to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported,
the Taliban or Al Qaeda forces. 45 The Court of Appeals for the
DC Circuit recently addressed the question of who may be
lawfully detained in its decision in Al-Bihani v. Obama.46 Al-Bihani
is a Yemeni citizen detained at Guantdnamo who traveled from
Pakistan to Afghanistan to serve in a paramilitary group allied
with the Taliban against US forces.47 Al-Bihani stayed at Al
Qaeda-affiliated guesthouses and may have received instruction
at Al Qaeda camps. Although he only served as a cook for the
group, he did carry an Al Qaeda-issued weapon. 48 The court held
that Al-Bihani's detention was lawful, accepting the Obama
administration's view on who could be detained. 49 For the court,
Al-Bihani's membership as a cook in the group associated with
the Taliban was enough to justify his detention.5 0 The court did
not, however, establish a method by which to determine what
constitutes "sufficient support or indicia of membership to meet

challenges from Guantinamo detainees, district court judges have evaluated the legality
of a detainee's detention on a case-by-case basis, and the DC Circuit has weighed in as
those cases are appealed. See, e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (reversing the district court's grant of habeas, holding, "'[A]IIl necessary and
appropriate force' includes the power to capture and detain those described in the
[AUMF]. The government may therefore hold at Guantinamo and elsewhere those
individuals who are 'part of' al-Qaida, the Taliban, or associated forces" (internal
citations omitted)), cert. denied, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 646 (Jan. 18, 2011); Al-Bihani v.
Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the petitioner was lawfully
detained whether, as the district court decided, he was part of or supported Taliban or
Al Qaeda forces or, as the government defined it, he substantially supported those
forces).
44. Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
45. See id.

46. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
47. Id. at 869.
48. Id.

49. Id. at 872. Those who "are part of forces associated with Al Qaeda or the
Taliban" and "those who purposefully and materially support such forces in hostilities
against U.S. coalition partners" are detainable under this decision. Id.
50. Id. at 872-73.
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the detention standard."5 1 This question was left to district court
judges to answer.5 2
4.

International Law

While the previous Sections looked to US law for detention
authority, this Section evaluates whether international law
provides such authority. The Supreme Court has held that the
"war on terror" is an armed conflict and is governed by the
Geneva Conventions.53 Common Article 2 of the Geneva
Conventions provides that the Geneva Conventions apply to "all
cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties." 54
While Al Qaeda is not a contracting party and may not benefit
from the full protections of the Conventions as provided in
Common Article 2, the Taliban, as the government of
Afghanistan, is a party.5 5 Common Article 3, however, is
applicable to Al Qaeda members.5 6 Common Article 3 provides
that, "in the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to
apply, as a minimum, [the provisions listed in the article]."67
While the Bush administration maintained that Common Article
3 did not apply to the conflict with Al Qaeda,58 the US Supreme
51. Id. at 874.
52. Many of the available GuantAnamo habeas decisions were decided before the
DC Circuit's decision in Al-Bihani. Unless overturned, the definition found in the AlBihani decision will control. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 23 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
("Therefore, as the panel opinion explained, the Military Commissions Act [of 20091
definitively establishes that those who purposefully and materially support al Qaeda may
be detained for the duration of the hostilities, regardless of what international law might
otherwise say about detention of such supporters.").
53. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006).
54. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
55. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629 & n.60 ("Al Qaeda, unlike Afghanistan, is not a
'High Contracting Party'-i.e.,a signatory of the Conventions.").
56. See id. at 630. While the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit held that the
Geneva Conventions were not judicially enforceable in US courts, the Supreme Court
rejected this idea. See id. at 626-28.
57. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 54, art. 3.
58. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630 ("[Tlhe Government asserts[] that Common
Article 3 does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda, being
'international in scope,' does not qualify as a 'conflict not of an international
character.'").
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Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, has held that it does in fact apply5 9
and that the "war on terror" rises to the level of an armed
conflict.60
It is unclear, however, whether a "war-on-terror" detainee is
considered a "prisoner of war" under the Geneva Conventions. 6 1
If the detainee is a prisoner of war, he is entitled to the full
protections of the conventions.62 Whether a detainee is a
prisoner of war arguably depends on whether he is a lawful
enemy combatant, as opposed to an unlawful enemy
combatant.63 The terms "lawful enemy combatant" and "unlawful
enemy combatant" are often used but rarely defined.6 Under
59. See id. at 631 ("Common Article 3, then, is applicable here.").
60. See id. at 630 ("Common Article 3 ... affords some minimal protection, falling
short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a
signatory nor even a nonsignatory 'Power' who are involved in a conflict 'in the territory
of' a signatory. The latter kind of conflict is distinguishable from the conflict described
in Common Article 2 chiefly because it does not involve a clash between nations.").
61. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 54, art. 4 (establishing classes of people
who are considered prisoners of war).
62. See id. arts. 12-16.
63. See id. art. 4.
64. See, e.g., U.S. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119
Stat. 2680, 2740-44 (2005) (creating combatant status review tribunals, but neglecting to
define "combatant") (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004) ("The legal category of enemy combatant has not been
elaborated upon in great detail. The permissible bounds of the category will be defined
by the lower courts as subsequent cases are presented to them."); Exec. Order No.
13,440, 72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (july 20, 2007) (using the term "unlawful enemy
combatant," but not including the term in its list of definitions); Exec. Order No.
13,425, 72 Fed. Reg. 7737 (Feb. 14, 2007) (defining "unlawful enemy combatant" as it is
defined in the Military Commissions Act ("MCA") of 2006). The MCA of 2006 defines a
lawful enemy combatant as
(A) a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in hostilities
against the United States; (B) a member of a militia, volunteer corps, or
organized resistance movement belonging to a State party engaged in such
hostilities, which are under responsible command, wear a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance, carry their arms openly, and abide by the law of
war; or (C) a member of a regular armed force who professes allegiance to a
government engaged in such hostilities, but not recognized by the United
States.
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600,
263-36. An unlawful enemy combatant is defined as
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents
who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the
Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or (ii) a person who, before, on, or
after the date of the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has
been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status
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international law, lawful combatants may be detained for the
duration of the hostilities.65 It is less clear, however, whether
international law authorizes the military detention of unlawful
enemy combatants. 66
While international law may, to some, serve as authority for
military detention,6 7 there is dissent within the courts on this
issue.68 Some lower courts in the United States have dismissed
international law and held it to be inapplicable as a source of
rights within the United States.6 9 The Court of Appeals for the
DC Circuit summarizes this position: "We have no occasion here
to quibble over the intricate application of vague treaty
provisions and amorphous customary principles. The sources we
look to for resolution ...

are the sources courts always look to:

the text of relevant statutes and controlling domestic case law."70
The DC Circuit has recently refused to re-evaluate the issue of

Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established
authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense.

under the

Id.
65. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 54, art. 118 ("Prisoners of war shall be
released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.").
66. In Hamdan, the US Supreme Court held that Common Article 3 applies to
individuals involved in a conflict in the territory of a signatory power. Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631 (2006). The Court, however, evaluated the applicability of
Common Article 3 in the context of whatjudicial process was due to Hamdan, not in the
context of the legality of his detention. Id. at 631-32.
67. See Robert E. Barnsby, Yes, We Can: The Authority to Detain as Customary
InternationalLaw, 202 MIL. L. REV. 53, 54-55 (2009) (arguing that regardless of the type
of conflict, the authority to detain rises to the level of customary international law, as
detention in war is a fundamental and accepted tool).
68. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 587-88 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("The plurality relies primarily on Article 118 of the [Third Geneva Convention]....
But I do not believe that we may diminish the Federal Government's war powers by
reference to a treaty and certainly not to a treaty that does not apply."); see also Noriega
v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 1002, 1002 (2010) (Thomas and Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (arguing
that the US Supreme Court should address the open issue of the domestic applicability
of the Geneva Conventions).Justice Scalia joined in Thomas's dissent in Noriega.
69. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("The international
laws of war as a whole have not been implemented domestically by Congress and are
therefore not a source of authority for U.S. courts."); see also Noriega v. Pastrana, 564
F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that section 5 of the MCA of 2006, which provides
that no person may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights in a habeas
corpus or other action to which the United States is a party in a US court, precluded the
petitioner's argument that the Geneva Conventions gave him a right enforceable in
federal court, as an adjudged prisoner of war, to be repatriated to his home country).
70. Id. at 871-72.
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the enforceability of international law in US courts.7 1 This ruling
remains binding law within the DC Circuit, as the US Supreme
Court last addressed this issue in the detention context in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld under the specific circumstances of Hamdi's
detention.7 2
C.

Military Commissions

Having discussed authorization for detention outside the
United States, this Section briefly turns to the ability to try
foreign nationals so detained in the "war on terror" for crimes
related to terrorism. It seems settled that, under US law,
violations of the laws of war may be adjudicated before a military
commission.73 Current US law provides that unprivileged enemy
belligerents74 may be tried before a US military commission.75
Included in the codified definition of an "unprivileged enemy
belligerent" are those who have "engaged in hostilities against
the United States," those who have "purposefully or materially
supported hostilities against the United States," and those who
were members of Al Qaeda at the time the violation occurred.7 6
Since the enactment of the Military Commissions Act of 2009,
two convictions have been obtained using military commissions
at GuantAnamo, but both of these resulted from plea
agreements.
71. See AI-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying rehearing en
banc).
72. In Hamdi, the Supreme Court addressed the legality of an individual's
detention, including a discussion of international law, only in the very narrow
circumstances of the case. 542 U.S. at 521.
73. See Ex ParteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942); see also discussion infra Part II.C.
74. The Military Commissions Act of 2009 uses the terms "unprivileged enemy
belligerent," defined as an individual falling within one of the three categories discussed
in the text above, and "privileged belligerent," defined as an individual falling within
one of the eight categories in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, whereas the
MCA of 2006 used the terms "unlawful enemy combatant" and "lawful enemy
combatant." Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, sec. 1802, §§ 948a
(6)-(7), 123 Stat. 2190 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a (6)-(7)); see Military Commissions
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3(a) (1), 120 Stat. 2600, 2600-37.
75. 10 U.S.C. § 948c (2009).
76. Id. § 948a(7).
77. See Charlie Savage, Deal Averts Trial in Disputed Guantdinamo Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2010, at A12 (noting that Omar Khadr's plea agreement marks the second
military commission conviction of a Guantinamo detainee during President Obama's
administration); see also Peter Finn, Former Cook for Bin Laden Reaches Deal with US. on
Sentence; With Judge's Blessing, Prosecutionand Defense Seal Agreement, WASH. POST, Aug. 10,
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This Part has examined the law that applies to detention
and trial of foreign nationals abroad, specifically, at
GuantAnamo. This background analysis has produced several
conclusions that inform Part II. US jurisprudence on detention
in the "war on terror" is based in large part on the 2001 AUMF
and how US courts have interpreted its grant of authority to the
president." While international law and the laws of war have
informed the development of this jurisprudence, its role on US
soil and application in US courts is anything but secure.79 Military
commissions as constituted under the MCA of 2009, though the
subject of much debate,o have been little used at Guantinamo.x
Because of this, few examples are available to inform an analysis
of this venue for terrorism trials. Anticipating a continuation of
the "war on terror" after the once-promised closure of the
Guantinamo detention facilities, Part II turns to the question of
detention and trial on US soil.

II. CURRENT CONFLICT: DETENTTON AND TRIAL ON US SOIL
The conflict over which system should be employed to
detain and try foreign nationals suspected to be terrorists on US
soil received an increased amount of attention beginning in
December 2009, when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to
ignite a bomb hidden in his underwear on a plane over Detroit.82
The controversy that arose over trying Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the September 11
attacks, in a federal district court in lower Manhattan near the
site of the attacks has only added to the debate over venue.8 3
More recently, evidentiary rulings and the jury's verdict in
Ahmed Ghailani's federal criminal trial have given rise to a

2010, at A4 (stating that Ibrahim Al-Qosi's plea agreement marked the first conviction
by military commission of a Guantinamo detainee since President Obama took office in
2009).
78. See supranotes 35-52 and accompanying text.

79. See supranotes 53-72 and accompanying text.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See, e.g., infra notes 145, 156-65 and accompanying text.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.E.1.
See Michael Barbaro & Al Baker, Bloomberg Balks at 9/11 Trial, Dealing Blow to

White House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, at Al (discussing opposition to the plan to
prosecute Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in federal court); see also discussion infra Part
II.E.2.
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renewed push for the use of military commissions. Given the
defense-spending
enacted
recently
in
the
provisions
authorization bill for 2011, a federal criminal trial currently
85
seems to be unavailable to those detained at Guantinamo.
Section A evaluates the legality of military detention of foreign
nationals on US soil, and Section B discusses whether a detainee
may challenge this detention. Section C moves to the question of
whether foreign detainees may be tried by military commissions
on US soil. Section D examines the alternative to military
commissions: the US criminal justice system. Finally, Section E
presents recent developments and controversies to illuminate
this debate.
A.

Legality of Military Detention within the United States

Most of the legal discussion of the government's ability to
detain suspected terrorists has focused on detention that took
place outside of the United States, and, as seen in Part I, this
issue has yet to be completely resolved. The question of whether
the government may detain within the United States suspected
terrorists has been addressed even less. 86 This Section will analyze
the sources of law that may authorize military detention on US
soil.
1. Alien Enemy Act
The Alien Enemy Act of 1798 ("Alien Enemy Act") provides
that in a state of declared war or invasion by a foreign nation or
government, all citizens, natives, or subjects of the foreign nation
in the United States may be "apprehended, restrained, secured,

84. See infra Part II.E.3.
85. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (explaining the provisions). But see
Peter Finn & Anne E. Komblut, White House May Challenge Bill's Guantanamo Provisions,
WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2011, at A8 (reporting that the Obama administration was weighing
issuing a signing statement declaring that he would not enforce the provisions on
constitutional grounds); Charlie Savage, Obama May Bypass Guantdnamo Rules, Aides Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2011, at A15 (explaining that aides in the Obama administration have
advanced the idea that President Obama's executive authority allows him to disregard
the transfer-banning provisions).
86. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942). The Fourth Circuit specifically
addressed this question in its 2008 en banc decision in Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d
213, 326 (4th Cir. 2008) (5-4 decision), vacated as moot sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129
S. Ct. 1545 (2009); see also infra Part II.A.3.
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and removed as alien enemies."8 7 The majority opinion in
Johnson v. Eisentrager provides that courts will hear an alien's
challenge to executive custody under the act to determine
whether the US is at war and whether the alien is an alien enemy
subject to the act, referring to these questions as jurisdictional
elements." According to the majority in Eisentrager,once these
elements are met, courts will not inquire into any other
internment issues.8 9
While the language of the statute would suggest that it is
largely inapplicable to the "war on terror," given that the statute
refers to actions of nations and governments rather than of
nonstate actors, there may be room for debate. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
presented the question of whether a US citizen could be
detained in the "war on terror" and held that detention of a US
citizen was authorized.90 In his dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia
cites the Alien Enemy Act to support his argument that citizens
and aliens are not subject to the same wartime detention
authority;9 1 instead, he argues that citizens and noncitizens are
treated differently under the law.9 2
2.

US Supreme Court Precedent

The last time the US Supreme Court directly addressed the
question of whether foreign nationals can be subject to military
detention on US soil was in Ex Parte Quirin in 1942. In Quirin, the
Court evaluated whether the president could order the detention
and military trial of Germans who had entered the United States
with instructions to destroy American war industries and war
facilities while the United States was at war with Germany.93 The
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") detained the Germans
and later turned them over to military custody while they were
87. Alien Enemy Act of 1798, 1. Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.

§

21

(2003)).
88. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 (1950).
89. Id.
90. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (holding that detention of a US
citizen was lawful under the specific circumstances presented in that case).
91. See id. at 574 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The plurality's assertion that
detentions of citizen and alien combatants are equally authorized has no basis in law or
common sense. Citizens and noncitizens, even if equally dangerous, are not similarly
situated.").
92. Id.
93. Ex ParteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1942).
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awaiting trial before the military commission.9 4 The Court held
that the military commission was lawfully constituted and that
keeping the Germans in military custody pending trial before a
military commission was lawful.95 While Quinn is applicable on
the question of whether detainees may be tried before a military
commission,'9 6 it may not be applicable to the question of
whether military detention of foreign nationals on US soil is
authorized.9 7
A few years after it decided Quirin, the Court was again
presented with a wartime habeas question. Johnson v. Eisentrager
involved habeas petitions from Germans who were held abroad
and convicted for violating the laws of war and held overseas.98
Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, noted at the outset that
US law retains both the citizen-alien distinction and the friendlyenemy alien distinction.9 9 Justice Jackson also declared that an
enemy alien in the United States is subject to arrest and
internment whenever a declared war exists. 100
When the Court granted certiorari in Al-Maryi, many
anticipated that the it would have to directly address the question
of whether foreign nationals suspected to be terrorists could be
subject to military detention in the United States .101 The Court,
however, did not decide the question because it granted the

94. Id. at 21, 23.
95. Id. at 48.
96. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
97. As noted, it was the FBI that detained the Germans, and they were later placed
in military custody in anticipation of trial before the military commission. See Quirin, 317
U.S. at 21. The Court evaluated the legality of the detention in connection with the fact
that the detention was in anticipation of trial before the military commission. See id. at
48. The United States was also at war with Germany pursuant to a formal declaration of
war by Congress. See id. at 21.
98. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765-66 (1950).
99. Id. at 768-69 ("[O]ur law does not abolish inherent distinctions ... between
citizens and aliens, nor between aliens of friendly and of enemy allegiance, nor between
resident enemy aliens who have submitted themselves to our laws and nonresident
enemy aliens who at all times have remained with, and adhered to, enemy
governments.").
100. Id. at 775.
101. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008) (granting petition for writ of
certiorari); see also Adam Liptak, justices Take Case on President's Power to Detain, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2008, at All ("The central question in this case is whether Mr. Marri
should be treated as an enemy soldier who may be held until hostilities end or as a
criminal like Timothy J. McVeigh, who was convicted in a civilian court of blowing up
the Oklahoma City federal building.").
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government's application to transfer Al-Marri from military
custody to the custody of the US attorney general.102
3.

Fourth Circuit Reasoning in Al-Marri

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided AlMarri's case in a five-to-four en banc decision, issuing a lengthy
and complex opinion in which seven justices issued separate
concurrences or dissents. 0 3 While this decision was vacated as
moot after the US Supreme Court granted the government's
application to transfer Al-Marri, the opinion is instructive, as it is
the only instance in which a federal appellate court specifically
addressed the question of military detention of a foreign national
within the United States post-September 11.104
Al-Marri is a citizen of Qatar who was arrested in his home in
Illinois as a material witness in the September 11 investigation
and later indicted on criminal charges of making false
statements, possession of unauthorized or counterfeit credit
cards with intent to defraud, and using another person's
identification.1 0 5 After his arrest, however, President Bush
declared him an enemy combatant, and Al-Marri was transferred
to military detention on a brig in South Carolina. 06 The
government submitted evidence to the court that Al-Marri
received training and funding from Al Qaeda before the
September 11 attacks, entered the United States as a sleeper
agent, and was instructed to carry out additional terrorist
activities for Al Qaeda. 0 7 Al-Marri filed a habeas petition, arguing
that the government did not have the authority to detain him
because he was taken into custody in the United States and was
entitled to civilian status. 0 8

102. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
103. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), vacated as
moot sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
104. See Liptak, supra note 101, at All (stating that two other men, both US
citizens, had been detained in the United States as enemy combatants since September
11).
105. Al-Ma7ri, 534 F.3d at 219 (Motz,J., concurring).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 253 (Traxler, J., concurring).
108. Id. at 257.
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Five judges held that the government had authority for
military detention of a foreign national on US soil.'" In what can
be characterized as a deferential reading of the AUMF,no the
plurality of judges was persuaded that Al Qaeda is in fact an
enemy force whose members and supporters are rendered
detainable under that resolution, even on US soil."' After
analyzing US Supreme Court precedent, Judge Williams offered
her own definition of an enemy combatant subject to detention
pursuant to Congress' authorizations.1 2 According to Judge
Williams, a person qualifies as an enemy combatant if he or she
meets two criteria: "(1) he attempts or engages in belligerent acts
against the United States, either domestically or in a foreign
combat zone; (2) on behalf of an enemy force.""lS Under this
definition, Al-Marri was detainable as an enemy combatant.1 14
Four judges dissented from the majority's holding, arguing
that the government did not have authority for military detention
109. Id. at 216 (per curiam). There are two holdings in Al-Marri, the first of which
is the focus of this Section. The second holding answered in the negative the question of
whether AI-Marri had been afforded sufficient process to challenge his classification as
an enemy combatant. Id.
110. In its brief opposing Al-Marri's petition for certiorari, the government argued
that Congress must have intended to allow the detention of those like Al-Marri, as any
contrary interpretation
relies on the assumption that when Congress authorized the use of military
force to respond to the September 11 attacks, it did not intend to reach
individuals virtually identically situated to the September 11 hijackers, none of
whom had engaged in combat operations against our forces on a foreign
battlefield.
Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 24, Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680
(2008) (No. 08-368).
111. See Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 259-60 (Traxler, J., concurring) (reasoning that
Congress sought to target people affiliated with Al Qaeda, like Al-Marri, when it passed
the AUMF); id. at 285-86 (Williams, J., concurring & dissenting) ("The AUMF grants
the President power to use force against 'organizations' that he determines 'planned,
authorized, committed, or aided in' the September 11 attacks. Al Qaeda is obviously an
'organization' that 'planned, authorized, committed, or aided in' those attacks. Thus, in
my view, the AUMF has labeled Al Qaeda an enemy force."); id. at 294 (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring & dissenting) ("By ignoring the AUMF's plain language and patent
meaning, the plurality comes all too close to holding that no person lawfully in the
United States may be seized as an enemy combatant and subjected to military
detention.... That to me is the plain import of the plurality's view, and its
interpretation of the AUMF ... undermines Congress's intent.").
112. Id. at 285 (Williams, J., concurring & dissenting) (evaluating definitions of
enemy combatant' found in Hamdiand Quidn).
113. Id.
114. See id.
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of Al-Marri."' The dissenting judges cited the US Supreme
Court's decision in Ex Parte Milligan,"6 in which the Court held
that there was no justification to hold Milligan, a US citizen, as a
combatant under the laws of war, as he was a civilian and had to
be treated as such.'1 7 Relying on Milligan and narrow
interpretations of Quirin and Hamdi, the dissent reasoned that AlMarri could not be subjected to military detention because he
was not a combatant affiliated with the military arm of an enemy
government.1 18 Judge Motz pointed to United States v. Salerno"'
for the proposition that detention without trial is-and should
remain-a carefully limited exception to the norm.' 20
The question of whether a foreign national suspected to be
a terrorist may be militarily detained within the United States
remains open.' 2 ' While the vacated Al-Marri decision provides
insight into how the courts might analyze such a question, it is
not predictive. The five-to-four holding that the AUMF
authorized the detention of a foreign national on US soil is a
shaky one, and is rendered even more so by the Supreme Court's
decision to grant certiorari in the case.' 22 The tenuousness of the
threads binding the plurality together is demonstrated by Judge
Traxler, the swing vote on both questions in the Fourth Circuit
decision: "Like my colleagues, I agree that neither Hamdi nor
Padilla [v. Hanft]'23 compels the conclusion that the AUMF
115. Id. at 216 (per curiam).
116. Ex ParteMilligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). Milligan was an Indiana resident during
the Civil War; the government argued that he had communicated with the enemy,
conspired to seize war supplies, and had joined and aided an enemy organization in
order to overthrow the government. Id. at 6.
117. Id. at 121-22, 130; see Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 230 (Motz,J., concurring).
118. See Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 235 (Motz,J., concurring).
119. 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) ("In our society liberty is the norm, and detention
prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.").
120. See Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 243-44 (Motz, J., concurring) (criticizing Judge
Williams' definition of 'enemy combatant' as too malleable and vague to ensure that
detention without trial remains a carefully limited exception to the norm).
121. See Adam Liptak, justices Erase Ruling that Allowed Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2009, at A9 (stating that the Supreme Court erased a lower court ruling answering this
question); see also Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, Al-Marri Detention Case
Vacated (Mar. 6, 2009), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/
almarridetentioncase_vacated (stating the same and noting that the Supreme Court
did not take advantage of the opportunity to clarify the law on this question).
122. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
123. 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 547 U.S. 1062 (2006). In Padilla,the
Fourth Circuit held that a US citizen who took up arms with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan
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authorized the president to detain al-Marri as an enemy
combatant.... I disagree, however, that Ex Parte Milligan
compels the opposite conclusion." 124 Despite the fact that the
legality of military detention of foreign nationals suspected to be
terrorists on US soil remains unknown, the next Section turns to
the question of what rights a foreign national so detained would
have.
B.

Detainees'Rightsto Challenge the Lawfulness of Their Detention

While Congress and the Bush administration sought to limit
Guantinamo detainees' access to federal courts,12 5 the US
Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush ruled that Guant~inamo
detainees have the constitutional right to challenge the legality of
their detention in federal court through a petition for habeas
corpus.126 The Boumediene Court held that the habeasjurisdiction-stripping provision in the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 ("MCA of 2006"), which prohibited US courts from
considering a habeas petition from aliens detained by the United
States and was not specific to Guantionamo detainees,1 2 7 was an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ.128 Although Boumediene
involved GuantAnamo detainees, a foreign national detained in
and returned to the United States to carry out Al Qaeda-directed acts of terrorism could
be militarily detained as an enemy combatant on US soil pursuant to the AUMF. Id. at
391. Like Al-Marri, Padilla was transferred to civilian custody on the government's
motion. See Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084 (2006) (granting the government's
application to transfer Padilla to civilian custody).
124. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 259 (Traxler,J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
125. Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 to establish combatant
status review tribunals ("CSRTs") to determine the enemy combatant status of detainees
held at Guantinamo. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005,
119 Stat. 2680, 2740-44 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note). The Act
provided that no court could hear a habeas petition from Guantinamo detainees. Id. §
1005(e)(1). The Act also gave the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the validity of a CRST determination. Id. § 1005(e) (2) (A). The
MCA of 2006 also prohibited courts from hearing habeas petitions from "an alien
detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have
been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination."
7
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § (a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (1)).
126. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). The Court held that the CSRTs
fell well short of being an adequate substitute for habeas review. Id. at 767.
127. See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2241 (e) (1)).
128. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733.
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the "war on terror" in the United States would also benefit from
the decision and have the right to present a habeas petition. 129
While a detainee in the United States would have the right
to petition for habeas review, the right may not be immediately
available, and the remedy for unlawful detention may not be the
detainee's release. 3 0 Even though habeas courts must have the
power to order the release of an unlawfully held detainee, the
Boumediene Court noted that release need not be the exclusive
remedy and would not always be appropriate.' 3 ' The Court also
specified that lower courts could defer to the government for a
period of time for initial detention and screening. 3 2 The Court
noted that exigencies could require the judicial branch to stay
habeas proceedings until the government could comply with the
proceedings' requirements. 3 3 While a foreign national militarily
detained in the United States in the "war on terror" would be
able to challenge the basis for his detention, it is unclear how
robust that right would be in practice.

C.

Military Commission on US Soil

The previous Sections discussed the legality of detention of
foreign nationals on US soil and the right to challenge that
detention. This Section turns to the question of whether a
military commission on US soil may try foreign nationals for
terrorism-related crimes. While it is accepted that a military
commission may try foreign detainees for violations of the laws of
war outside the United States, whether detainees in the United
States may be tried before a military commission is debatable.134

129. Indeed, Al-Marri brought a habeas petition to challenge his detention on US
soil. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 216 n.* (4th Cir. 2008) ("The Government
relied on section 7 of the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006 .... [T]he Supreme
Court declared section 7 of the MCA unconstitutional. The Government now concedes
that we have jurisdiction over al-Marri's habeas petition." (citations omitted)), vacated as
moot sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
130. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779, 793-94.
131. Id. at 779.
132. Id. at 793-94 ("[P] roper deference can be accorded to reasonable procedures
for screening and initial detention under lawful and proper conditions of confinement
and treatment for a reasonable period of time.").
133. Id.
134. See discussion supra Part I.C; see also Savage & Shane, supra note 3, at A15
(explaining opinions from each side of the debate).
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1. US Supreme Court Precedent for Military Commissions on
US Soil in Ex Parte Quidn
The US Supreme Court's decision in Quinn establishes that
foreign nationals detained in the United States in wartime may
be tried before a military commission.135 While Quirin was
previously discussed in connection with detention authority, this
Section evaluates the precedent in Quirin for trial before a
military commission on US soil. In Article 15 of the Articles of
War, Congress provided that unlawful belligerents could be tried
and punished by military commission according to the law of
war.' 3 6 Eight Germans who had entered the United States with
explosives in order to destroy American war facilities13 7 were
charged with violating the laws of war and tried by the military
commission ordered by the president.1 38 The Court denied their
habeas petitions,13 9 reasoning that by coming into the country,
not in uniform, and with intentions to destroy American
facilities, the Germans became unlawful enemy belligerents who
could be tried and punished via military commission.'o
2.

Congressional Authorization: The Military Commissions Act
of 2009

In addition to the US Supreme Court's authorization for
trial by military commission, Congress has also authorized such
trials.141 Any "alien unprivileged enemy belligerent" is subject to
trial by military commissions under the Military Commissions Act
of 2009 ("MCA of 2009"),142 which supports the assertion that a
foreign national detained as a suspected terrorist within the
United States may be tried before a military commission. A
military commission under the MCA of 2009 has jurisdiction over
135. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942) (holding that the military commission
ordered by the President was lawfully constituted).
136. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759, 790 (Article of War 15); see also
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 35.
137. Id. at 21-22.
138. Id. at 23.
139. Id. at 48.
140. Id. at 37.
141. See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2190
(codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.); see also Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 1-10, 120 Stat. 2600, 2600-37, amended by Military Commissions
Act of 2009 §§ 1801-1807.
142. 10 U.S.C. § 948c.
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any alien unprivileged enemy belligerent for any offense
established in the MCA of 2009, Articles 104 and 106 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, or the laws of war.143 Crimes
covered under the MCA of 2009 include attacking civilians,
civilian objects, or protected property; murdering protected
persons; denying quarter; taking hostages; using poison; using
torture, cruel or inhuman treatment; intentionally causing
serious bodily injury in violation of the law of war; murdering in
violation of the law of war; destroying property in violation of the
law of war; hijacking or hazarding a nonmilitary vessel or aircraft;
committing terronsm; providing material support for terrorism;
wrongfully aiding the enemy; spying; and committing conspiracy,
among others. 1"
While the procedures established by the MCA of 2006 for
military commissions were widely criticized,1 45 the MCA of 2009
provides a little more process.1 46 Notice of the charges must be
given to the accused detainee "as soon as practicable";14 7
statements obtained through the use of torture or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment are excluded;" any other
statement that the detainee made can be admitted into evidence
if the judge finds that "the totality of the circumstances renders
the statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative value"
and that it was either made incident to lawful conduct during
military operations at the point of capture or was voluntarily
given.149 The detainee is also guaranteed the right to present
evidence in his defense, cross-examine witnesses, examine and
143. Id. § 948d.
144. Id. § 950t.
145. See

Military

Commissions

Act

of

2006,

ACLU

(Mar.

13,

2007),

http://www.aclu.org/national-security/military-commissions-act-2006 (stating that the
MCA of 2006 undermines the US Constitution and gives the President absolute power);
see also Peter Baker & David M. Herszenhom, Obama Planning to Keep Tribunals for

Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009, at A18 ("During last year's presidential campaign,
Mr. Obama called the military commission system put in place by Mr. Bush 'an
enormous failure' and vowed to 'reject the Military Commissions Act.'").
146. See Warren Richey, Obama Endorses Military Commissions for Guantdnamo

Detainees, CHRISTIAN Sa. MONITOR, Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Justice/2009/1029/p2sOl-usju.html ("[Slupporters say that the [MCA of 2009]
balances the demands of fairness and due process against a real-world need for flexibility
when seeking to prosecute accused Al Qaeda leaders and supporters.").
147. 10 U.S.C. § 948q(b).
148. Id. § 948r(a).
149. Id. § 948r(c).
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respond to all admitted evidence,15 0 be present for all acceptable
sessions of the commission, be represented by counsel, and
suppress evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, confusing on the
issues, or misleading.15 1 Hearsay evidence, however, may be
admitted by the military judge if he or she makes the required
determinations under the MCA of 2009.152 Convictions require
only a two-thirds vote of the members of the commission, 5 3 and
decisions of the military commission can be reconsidered by the
United States Court of Military Commission Review.154 The Court
of Appeals for the DC Circuit then has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction, and, subsequently, a defendant may petition the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.1 55 Based on these
procedures, the next Section addresses whether a trial before a
military commission meets international law obligations.
3.

Geneva Conventions Satisfied?

Trial before a military commission constituted under the
MCA of 2009 may satisfy the Geneva Conventions. In Hamdan,
the US Supreme Court noted that ordinary military courts are
included in the definition of a regularly constituted tribunal
required by Common Article 3.156 Regular military courts in the
US system are the courts-martial established by congressional
statutes. 57 Nevertheless, a military commission can be regularly
constituted "if some practical need explains deviations from
court-martial practice."' 58 According to the Court, however, the
military commission convened by President Bush to try Hamdan
for conspiracy was not an ordinary military court.'5 9

150. Id. § 949a(b) (2). The government may, however, seek to withhold classified
evidence that would damage national security. The judge may allow discovery if the
classified information would be noncumulative, relevant, and helpful to the defense.
The judge may also withhold certain items of classified information or substitute
4
4
summaries for classified information. See id. § 9 9p- .
151. Id. § 949a(b) (2).
152. Id. § 949a(b) (3) (D).
153. Id. § 949m.
154. Id. § 950f.
155. Id. § 950g.
156. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 632 (2004).
157. See id. at 632.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 632-33.
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While the commission at issue in Hamdan did not meet the
requirements of Common Article 3,160 a military commission
authorized under the MCA of 2009 may.' 6' Military commissions
as envisioned by the MCA of 2009 exist pursuant to congressional
statute, whereas the Hamdan commission did not.'12 In addition,
the Court in Hamdan took issue with the commission's
procedural rules that would have allowed Hamdan to be
convicted based on evidence he had not seen or heard and
would have allowed evidence to be admitted that did not comply
with the admissibility or relevance rules applicable in criminal
trials and court-martial proceedings.' 3 Congress and President
Obama enacted the MCA of 2009 to address the perceived
shortcomings of Bush's military commissions and those created
by the MCA of 2006.164 In Hamdan, the Court noted that
Common Article 3 allows for flexibility in trying individuals
captured during an armed conflict and that its general
requirements could accommodate a variety of legal systems.165
Whether the commissions created by the MCA of 2009 require
too much flexibility or are a legal system that can be
accommodated, however, is unclear.
D.

Alternatively: Civilian CriminalDetention and Trial Rather than
Military Detention and Trial before a Military Commission

While the previous Sections evaluated whether
nationals suspected of terrorism could be subject to
detention and trial before a military commission on
there is also the alternative of domestic, civilian

foreign
military
US soil,
criminal

160. The Court in Hamdan held that Common Article 3's requirements included
that the accused must be present for his trial and that he must hear the evidence against
him. Id. at 634-35.
161. See id. at 621.
162. See id. at 593; see also discussion supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Military
Commissions Act of 2009).
163. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 615-16.
164. See David Johnston, In Senate, Debate on Detainee Legal Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
2009, at A18 ("The changes [in the MCA of 2009] would be intended to withstand legal
challenges and bolster the credibility of the tribunals domestically and overseas."); see
also Josh Gerstein, Obama Signs Military Commissions Reforms, POLITICO (Oct. 28, 2009,
4:58PM),
http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/1009/Obamasigns.Military
commissionsreforms.html (stating that the MCA of 2009 was designed to meet the legal
standards set out by the Supreme Court in its recent decisions).
165. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 635.
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detention and trial in the criminal justice system. Some argue
that detention by law enforcement authorities in anticipation of
criminal prosecution in a civilian court is the only appropriate
option for suspected terrorists detained in the United States.16 6
Some also question the implications that a rule allowing the
military to detain foreign nationals on US soil would have for US
citizens.16 7
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 ("Patriot Act") authorizes the
detention of foreign nationals for terrorism-related crimes
committed in the United States. 68 The Act enlarges the criminal
law with respect to terrorism, terrorist conspiracies, 169 and
supporting terrorism; 170 and increases the maximum penalties
that can be given for terrorism-related offenses. 171 Enacted after
the September 11 attacks, the Patriot Act amended federal
criminal law to address the needs of post-9/11 America, making
detention by law enforcement authorities and a criminal trial in
the civilian justice system a viable option for foreign nationals
suspected to be terrorists.1 72
166. See Editorial, Indefinite Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2008, at A30 ("There is
no authority, in the Constitution or in any law passed by Congress, for a president to
seize and detain indefinitely individuals in the United States without charges. If the
government wants to imprison such suspects, it should bring regular criminal charges
against them in the civilian system."); see also USA: Abandon Military Commissions, End
Indefinite Detention Without Criminal Trial, AMNESTY INT'L, Apr. 30, 2010,
http://www.amnesty.org/en/appeals-for-action/usa-abandon-military-commissions-endindefinite-detention-without-criminal-trial-0 (calling for trials in civilian courts rather
than by military commission).
167. See Editorial, supra note 166, at A30 ("The federal appeals court made clear
that its ruling upholding the president's power to detain enemy combatants applies
equally to American citizens. If the ruling stands, presidents would be able to throw out
due process, habeas corpus and other basic constitutional and statutory rights for
anyone they declared to have terrorist ties.").
168. Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 801-817, 115 Stat. 272, 374-86.
169. Id. §§ 801-803, 808, 811, 817(2) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.)
(amending existing federal laws to reflect new definitions of terrorism-related crimes).
170. Id. §§ 803, 805, 807 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.) (adding a
crime for concealing or harboring terrorists, and amending existing federal law).
171. Id. § 810 (increasing the maximum sentences a convicted defendant could
receive for terrorism-related crimes, for example, by adding five years to the maximum
sentence, doubling the maximum sentence, or authorizing life in prison where it had
not been authorized before).
172. See Richard A. Serrano, Holder Defends Arrest of Alleged Airline Bomb Plotter,L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at A1O (stating that US Attorney General Eric Holder defended the
decision to charge Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab with federal crimes and to detain him
in connection with those charges); see also Benjamin Weiser, Top Terror ProsecutorIs a
Critic of Civilian Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2010, at Al (discussing successful civilian
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Detention by law enforcement authorities in the United
States and subsequent criminal trial in the civilian justice system
bring more stringent procedural protections than military
commissions do: (1) arrests require probable cause;173 (2) those
arrested on criminal charges must be read their Mirandarights;
(3) the prosecution may not use any statements made by the
suspect during interrogation if the suspect was not apprised of
his or her rights; 174 (4) the Federal Rules of Evidence exclude
hearsay statements unless they fit within narrow exceptions; 7 5 (5)
in order for evidence to be admitted, it must be authenticated or
identified;'7 6 and (6) convictions require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.17 7
While these guarantees provide a detainee with more rights,
they may also create problems for the government when trying
the detainee. For example, evidence gained through the use of
enhanced interrogation techniques would likely be excluded.
President Obama has prohibited the use of such techniques,17 8
but many of the Guantinamo detainees were subjected to them
before this prohibition.179 Any confessions obtained through the
use of enhanced interrogation techniques would create
evidentiary problems in a federal courtroom.18 0

criminal trials for acts of terrorism occurring before September 11 and the Obama
administration's use of these successes as support for civilian terrorism prosecutions).
173. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
174. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). There is, however, an
exception to the Mirandarule. If there is a situation in which a threat to public safety
arises, the police may question a suspect immediately without reading the Miranda
rights. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984).
175. FED. R. EviD. 802.
176. See FED. R. Evia 901.
177. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
178. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4894 (Jan. 27, 2009) (prohibiting the
use of any interrogation techniques not in the Army Field Manual).
179. See Matthew Alexander, Opinion, I'm Still Tortured by What I Saw in Iraq,WASH.
POST, Nov. 30, 2008, at BI, (referring to torture and abuse in interrogations); see also
John Schwartz, Path to justice, but Bumpy, for Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2009, at A9
(citing obstacles posed by evidence gained through brutal treatment as a reason to use
military commissions rather than civilian courts).
180. See Schwartz, supra note 179 ("Some methods used by Bush administration
officials to gather evidence were shadowy and perhaps tainted."); see also Marisa Taylor,
ProsecutorsBuild Solid Case against Suspect, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 28, 2010, at IHA (stating
that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's confessions, which were gained through the use of
waterboarding, have become a liability for the Justice Department in US court).
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There are, however, also advantages to defendants and to
the government when using the criminal justice system. Rather
than excluding information that is potentially helpful to a
defendant on national security grounds, the Classified
Information Procedures Act allows for a balancing between the
need to protect classified information and a defendant's rights in
a federal criminal trial.18 1 The government would also benefit
from a criminal trial in federal court from a foreign affairs
standpoint. A criminal trial in federal court is seen as the gold
standard of justice.182 The rights available to defendants in
federal court surpass those required by the Geneva
Conventions.'13
E.

Boiling Point: The ChristmasDay Bomber, Trying the Mastermind
of September 11, and Opinionsfrom Every Side

Recent controversies illuminate the current conflict and
spur the debate over what to do with detainees in the United
States. This Section discusses the disputes surrounding the
detention of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the debate over where
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed should be tried, the impact of the
verdict in Ahmed Ghailani's trial in federal court, opinions from
a variety of sources on these issues, and legislation that was
introduced to address the competing concerns that came to
light.

181. See Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025
(1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2000); see also Al-Marri v.
Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 309 (4th Cir. 2008) (54 decision en banc) (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring & dissenting) (describing the Classified Information Procedures Act as a
corrective measure designed to protect the government's national security needs while
protecting individual rights), vacated as moot sub nom. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct.
1545 (2009).
182. See Morris Davis, Op-Ed., justice and Guantanamo Bay, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11,
2009, at A21 ("The evidence likely to clear the high bar gets gold medal justice: a
traditional trial in our federal courts.").
183. See id. Common Article 3 requires that "[p]ersons taking no active part in the
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed hors de combat by ... detention" have a "judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples" before sentences are passed. See Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 54, art. 3(1).
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1. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
On December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a
Nigerian citizen, attempted to ignite a bomb hidden in his
underwear while he was on a plane over Detroit.8 4 He was
arrested by law enforcement authorities and questioned by
federal agents.'8 5 Officials said that Abdulmutallab initially
provided information and intelligence freely, but, after being
read his Miranda rights hours after his arrest, Abdulmutallab
"went silent."186 The Miranda issue generated much debate in
both Congress and the media. 8 7 Many faulted the handling of
Abdulmutallab as having prevented the military and intelligence
community from obtaining vital information about operations
and possible future attacks. 8 8 Some argued that Abdulmutallab
should not have been read his Miranda rights and that US
intelligence agencies should have been consulted before
Abdulmutallab was informed of his rights.' 89 Some theorized that
184. See Devlin Barrett, Details ofArrest of Bombing Suspect Disclosed, WASH. POST, Jan.
24, 2010, at A3 (describing the bombing attempt); see also Mark Hosenball, The
Radicalizationof Umar FaroukAbdulmutallab, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 11, 2010, at 37-41, available
at
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/01/01/the-radicalization-of-umar-faroukabdulmutallab.html (describing the same).
185. See Barrett, supra note 184, at A3; see also Walter Pincus, ChristmasDay Bomb
Suspect Was Read Miranda Rights Nine Hours after Arrest, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2010, at A6
(stating that Abdulmutallab was first questioned more than three hours after arrest).
186. See Barrett, supra note 184, at A3; see also Spenser S. Hsu & Jennifer Agiesta,
Intelligence Chief Says FBI Was Too Hasty in Handling of Attempted Bombing, WASH. POST,
Jan. 21, 2010, at A3 (stating that Abdulmutallab asked for a lawyer and stopped talking
after he was read his rights).
187. See, e.g., Intelligence Reform: The Lessons and Implications of the Christmas Day
Attack: Hearing Before the S. Homeland Sec. Comm., 110th Cong. 34 (2010) [hereinafter
Committee Hearing on Intelligence Reform] (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins,
Ranking Member, S. Homeland Sec. Comm.); Hsu & Agiesta, supra note 186, at A3
(noting that some saw the Obama administration's choices regarding Abdulmutallab as
a mistake); Eli Lake, 9/11 Panel Chiefs Fault Handling of Bomb Suspect, WASH. TIMES, Jan.
27, 2010, at Al (stating that leaders of a commission that investigated September I1 told
a US Senate panel that the interrogation of Abdulmutallab was mishandled); Serrano,
supra note 172, at AIO (discussing Republican Party's criticism of the decision to arrest
Abdulmutallab and read him his rights).
188. See, e.g., Committee Hearing on Intelligence Reform, supra note 187, at 11
(statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins); id. at 18 (statement of Sen. John McCain); Lake,
supra note 187 (discussing views among some that opportunities to gain information
about future attacks and operations were wasted).
189. See, e.g., Committee Hearing on Intelligence Reform, supra note 187, at 11
(statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins); id. at 18 (statement of Sen. John McCain); Hsu &
Agiesta, supra note 186, at A3 (explaining the views of those who criticized placing
Abdulmutallab in the civilian system); Lake, supra note 187, at Al (pointing to both
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the delay in reading Abdulmutallab his Mirandarights stemmed
from a decision that his confession would not be needed to
convict him given the number of witnesses.o9 0 It is unclear
whether the statements Abdulmutallab made before receiving
Miranda warnings could be admitted under the threat to public
safety exception to Miranda because questioning did not start
until over three hours after his arrest. 9 1 If the exception does not
apply, statements he made during questioning may not be
admitted at trial.192 While Miranda applies in federal courtrooms,
the rules that govern a military commission do not require that
Miranda warnings be given in order for evidence to be
admissible. 9 3
2.

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

The trial of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, one of the accused
September 11 masterminds, was at one time going to take place
in federal court in Manhattan.194 After the announcement was
made, many began to discuss the logistical expense of holding
the trial in Manhattan, and Mayor Michael Bloomberg and many
others in New York City opposed holding the trial there.195 The
security costs alone for the trial could have exceeded US$200
million a year.196 Echoing the views of many, Mayor Bloomberg
remarked, "Can we provide security? Yes. Could you provide
security elsewhere? Yeah. The suggestion of a military base is
probably a reasonably good one."19 7 The Obama administration
is now trying to decide where to hold the trial, and there is still a

Democrats and Republicans who believed intelligence agencies should have been
consulted before granting Abdulmutallab constitutional protections).
190. See Committee Hearing on Intelligence Reform, supra note 187, at 29
(statement of Sen. Claire McCaskill).
191. See Barrett, supra note 184, at A3; Pincus, supra note 185, at A6 (stating that
Abdulmutallab was not questioned until over three hours after he was arrested); see also
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984) (discussing the public safety exception
to the Mirandarule).
192. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
193. See 10 U.S.C. § 949a (2009).
194. See Barbaro & Baker, supra note 83, at Al (discussing Mayor Michael
Bloomberg's opposition to holding the trial in Manhattan).
195. See id.
196. See id.

197. Id.
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debate over whether the trial should be held in civilian court or
before a military commission. 198
3.

Ahmed Ghailani

Since a controversial ruling made in the case in October
2010, the criminal trial of Ahmed Ghailani in federal court has
made headlines and fueled the debate over the proper venue for
post-September 11 terrorism trials."' Ahmed Ghailani is a
Tanzanian citizen who was held in US Central Intelligence
Agency ("CIA") custody and at Guantinamo for five years before
he was brought to the United States to stand trial in connection
with the bombings of US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. 200 In
October, Judge Kaplan barred the testimony of a critical witness
for the government who was first discovered, the defense argued,
from statements made by Ghailani while tortured in CIA
custody. 201 One month later, Ahmed Ghailani was convicted on
one count of conspiracy in connection with the embassy
bombings and acquitted on 284 other related counts. 20 2 The
conspiracy count carries a potential sentence of life in prison,

198. See Charlie Savage, White House Postpones Picking Site of 9/11 Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 2010, at A13 (stating that a decision has yet to be made on where to try Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed); see also Some Issues Still Blocking Sept. 11 Trial, Holder Says, N.Y.
TIMESJuly 11, 2010, at A13 (stating the same).
199. See Editorial, The Ghailani Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at A30
(describing some US congressmen's outcry over the verdict); see alsoJack Goldsmith,
Op-Ed., Don't Try Terrorists, Lock Them Up, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010, at A21 (stating that
"liberals and civil libertarians" applauded Judge Kaplan's October 2010 ruling excluding
the testimony of a government witness discovered through Ghailani's torture).
200. See Editorial, The Ghailani Verdict, supra note 199, at A30; see also United States
v. Ghailani, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134739, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2010).
201. See United States v. Ghailani, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109690, at *4-5 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 6, 2010); see also Benjamin Weiser,Judge Bars Major Witness from Terrorism Tial, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, at Al.
202. See Ghailani, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134739, at *1; see also Charlie Savage,
Ghaliani Verdict Reignites Debate over the Proper Court for Terrorism Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 2010, at Al8.
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with a minimum sentence of twenty years.20 3 In January, 2011,
Ghailani received a life sentence. 20 4
Many were quick to point to Ghailani's acquittals as
testimony to the fact that "war-on-terror" detainees should be
tried before a military commission, calling the conviction on just
2
Others, however, lauded the trial as
one count "a close call."o
an example of the US Constitution and the American criminal
justice system working as they should. 20 ' Jack Goldsmith, an
assistant attorney general during the Bush administration, now a
professor at Harvard Law School, went so far as to say that the
Ghailani trial proved that trials of those detained in the "war on
terror," and especially of those who were held at Guantdnamo,
are not viable, whether in federal court or before a military
commission, and that the administration should embrace military
detention without trial.2 07

203. See Benjamin Weiser & Charlie Savage, At Terror Trial, Big Questions Were
Avoided, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at Al (stating that the conspiracy count carries a
prison sentence of between twenty years and life); see also Peter Finn, Terror Detainee
Largely Acquitted, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2010, at A2 (stating the same).
204. See Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Detainee Gets Life Sentence in Embassy Blasts, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2011, at A18; see also Peter Finn, Embassy Bomber Receives Life Sentence, WASH.
POST., Jan. 26, 2011, at A2.
205. See Finn, supra note 203, at A2 ("For some, a conviction on only one count
amounted to a close call."); see also Anne E. Kornblut & Peter Finn, Verdict in Terror Case
a Setback for Advocates of Civilian Trials, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2010, at A2 ("Across the
administration, from the White House to the Justice Department, and among some
human rights advocates, there was private dismay that the first trial of a Guantanamo
Bay detainee brought into the United States did not result in a clear and unequivocal
conviction on all counts."); Editorial, supra note 199, at A30 (stating that US Senator
John McCain pointed to the Ghailani verdict as proof that all terrorism trials should take
place before military commissions, saying that they were created to "get the job done").
206. See Editorial, supra note 199, at A30 ("The problem was never the choice of a
court. The 12 civilian jurors were not too weak-minded, as Mr. King seems to think. The
judge was not coddling terrorists. He was respecting the Constitution and the law."); see
also Savage, supra note 202 (" [The administration and supporters of civilian trials]
argued that the system had shown that a terrorist could be convicted and sentenced to a
stiff prison term even after ajudge excluded evidence tainted by coercive interrogations
during the Bush administration.").
207. See Goldsmith, supra note 199, at A21 ("The real lesson of the ruling, however,
is that prosecution in either criminal court or a tribunal is the wrong approach. The
administration should instead embrace what has been the main mechanism for terrorist
incapacitation since 9/11: military detention without charge or trial.").
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4. The Debate Continues
Al-Marri, whose case presented difficult questions, 20 8
reached a plea deal with the US Department of Justice ("DOJ")
on the federal criminal charges brought against him.20 9 John
Schwartz noted that, in agreeing to the plea deal, the DOJ
"essentially acknowledged that it would have a hard time
prosecuting Mr. Marri to the full extent of the law" and avoided
the embarrassment of trying a case with evidence gained through
enhanced interrogation
techniques. 210 Al-Marri's case is
representative of the difficulties associated with prosecuting "waron-terror" detainees in a civilian criminal trial. As Judge
Wilkinson explained in his concurring and dissenting opinion in

Al-Marri,
I respect the aspiration that criminal prosecutions be the
preferred way of addressing every threat that awaits the
nation. But, as the Court and constitutional tradition have
long recognized, this is not an ideal world, and not every
threat to community safety can be handled by the criminal
justice system.211
Some worry what kind of message having two systems for
terrorism trials sends. Morris Davis, the former chief prosecutor
for the military commissions, argues for definitively choosing
either a federal courtroom or a military commission rather than
deciding on a piecemeal basis212 because establishing a legal
double standard will only reinforce the negative perceptions that
already exist with regard to the United States' commitment to the
law.2 13 Jack Goldsmith theorizes that the Obama administration

208. See discussion supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Al-Marri's case).
209. See Schwartz, supra note 179, at A9 (discussing Al-Marri's plea bargain).
210. Id. ("Through the plea deal, the government avoids the embarrassment and
the tricky work of proving a case with evidence that might have been derived through
the harshest interrogation techniques approved by the Bush administration.").
211. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 305 (4th Cir. 2008) (5-4 decision en
banc) (Wilkinson, J., concurring & dissenting), vacated as moot sub nom. Al-Marri v.
Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
212. See Davis, supra note 182, at A21 (arguing that the use of both the military
system and the civilian criminal justice system is a mistake).
213. See id. ("Double standards don't play well in Peoria. They won't play well in
Peshawar or Palembang either. We need to work to change the negative perceptions
that exist about Guantdnamo and our commitment to the law. Formally establishing a
legal double standard will only reinforce them.").

2011]

"WAR-ON-TERROR" DETAINEES IN THE US

539

has insisted on trials because of the perception among foreign
allies that federal trials are more legitimate. 1
Others worry that an open trial in federal court gives
terrorists a microphone through which to promote their cause
and pass along sensitive information.2 15 The pendulum swings
both ways, however, as others, including President Obama, worry
that continuing to give detainees limited rights only serves as a
recruiting banner to those who would join the terrorist cause.2 16
Even a GuantAnamo detainee has weighed in on the debate.217
Ahmed Ghailani has said that he prefers the civilian system and
the more expansive rights it has given him.2 18 Ghailani added,
however, that the judges at Guantinamo and in federal court
"seemed the same."2 19
5.

Proposed Legislation

Some members of Congress have proposed new
codifications of rules and procedures for handling those cases
like Abdulmutallab's and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's. 220 These
bills have since been allowed to lapse with the close of the 111th
214. See Goldsmith, supra note 199, at A21.
215. Judge Wilkinson notes, "[W]hile a showcase of American values, an open and
public criminal trial may also serve as a platform for suspected terrorists. Terror suspects
may use the bully pulpit of a criminal trial in an attempt to recruit others to their cause."
Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 307 (Wilkinson, J., concurring & dissenting). Judge Wilkinson also
notes that terror suspects could use the opportunity provided by criminal trials to
interact with others to pass critical intelligence on to their allies. Id. at 307.
216. See President Barack Obama, Remarks on Security Reviews (Jan. 5, 2010),
[hereinafter Obama Remarks], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-security-reviews (stating that the prison at Guantinamo had become a
"tremendous recruiting tool" for Al Qaeda); see also Alexander, supra note 179, at BI
(stating that torture and abuse cost American lives and recruits fighters for Al Qaeda).
217. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Report Shows Detainee's Insight into Legal Process, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at A16 (discussing Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani's views on the
protections he has while standing trial in federal court).
218. See id. (documenting Ghailani's opinions on the two systems); see also
Benjamin Weiser, Trial ofMan Once Held at Guantdnamo Opens, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010,
at A21.
219. Weiser, supra note 217.
220. See Josh Gerstein, Graham Quietly Files Gitmo Habeas Bill, POLITICO (Aug. 11,
2010), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=62C1EF84-18FE-70B2-A8FEO4DEE
FA52344 (discussing Senator Lindsey Graham's bill); see also Senator John McCain,
Statement on the Enemy Belligerent Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of
2010 (Mar. 4. 2010), [hereinafter Statement by Senator McCain], available at
http://mcain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.FloorStatements&
ContentRecord id=2AF6OF3A-05DC-CDF6-7DC9-6501A995C17C.
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session of Congress, but they merit discussion for the insight they
provide into any willingness in Congress to shape new rules going
forward. For instance, Senator Lindsey Graham introduced the
Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act on August 4, 2010.221
This bill, if enacted, would have established new rules for
detention review.22 2 Individuals covered under the bill included
both those detained at GuantAinamo and those the United States
would seek to hold as unprivileged enemy belligerents. 2 2 3 The bill
would have established new rules governing habeas corpus
petitions in DC district courts, including requiring that such
petitions be stayed pending the outcome of military commissions
procedures and executive transfer efforts. 224 The bill would have
also prevented detainees from being released into the United
States. 22 5
In March 2010, SenatorJohn McCain introduced the Enemy
Belligerent Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of
2010,226 a bill which, if enacted, would have eliminated the choice
between law-enforcement detention and federal criminal trial for
terror detainees.22 7 The bill mandated military detention if the
interagency team of experts the bill sought to establish
determined that the person was an enemy belligerent.2 2 8 That
determination had to be made within forty-eight hours of taking
a detainee into custody.2 2 9 The bill explicitly provided that
detainees would not be given Miranda warnings2 30 and would
have authorized the indefinite detention of an unprivileged
enemy belligerent without trial.2 31 Most importantly, the bill
221. Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act, S. 3707, 111th Cong. (2010).
222. See Gerstein, supra note 220 (stating that the bill would clarify who could be
detained and how much evidence would be needed to continue detention); see also

Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act § 2(a).
223. Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act § 2(a).
224. Id.
225. Id.

226. Enemy Belligerent Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010, S.
3081, 111th Cong. (2010).
227. See Statement by Senator McCain, supra note 220; see also Enemy Belligerent
Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010 §§ 2-4.
228. Enemy Belligerent Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010 §
2(a).
229. Id. § 3.
230. Id. § 3(b) (3).
231. Id. § 5. This Act distinguishes between privileged belligerents, who belong to
one of the eight categories in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention; and

2011]

"WAR-ON-TERROR" DETAINEES IN THE US

541

would have withdrawn the option of a criminal trial in an Article
III court.2 32 Had the bill been passed and upheld by courts if
challenged, there would have only been one option: trial before
a military commission.
This Part has evaluated whether foreign nationals can be
subject to military detention and trial before a military
commission on US soil in the "war on terror." It also discussed
the domestic alternative of detention and trial in the civilian
criminal justice system. The procedures for trial in each system
and whether the two systems satisfy international law are essential
in evaluating these two options. This Part presented recent
controversies surrounding detention and trial of foreign
nationals in the "war on terror" in an attempt to illuminate the
debate. Newly enacted legislation may alter-or even render
moot-the debate.3
III. "A WAR IS A WAR.... YOU DON'T BRING YOUR ENEMIES
TO THE COURTHOUSE "234: MILITARY DETENTION AND
MILITARY COMMISSION TRIAL AS THE BETTER OPTION?
The September 11 attacks, the unusual nature of terrorism,
and the legal status of Al Qaeda members have mudded the law
regarding detention. 23 5 In the "war on terror," it is no longer the
unprivileged enemy belligerents-someone other than a privileged belligerent who
engages in hostilities against the United States, has purposely and materially supported
hostilities against the United States, or was a part of Al Qaeda when captured. See id. §
6(8)-(9).
232. Id. § 4(a).
233. See supra notes 5-8, 11 and accompanying text (describing Congress's most
recent ban on transfers of GuantAnamo detainees to the United States and the Obama
administration's reaction to the ban).
234. See Weiser, supra note 172 (quoting Andrew McCarthy, the lead prosecutor in
the terrorism trial of a group of men who plotted to blow up the United Nations
building, the Holland Tunnel, the Lincoln Tunnel, and other New York City
landmarks).
235. See, e.g., supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional
authority for detention); supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing
congressional authorization for detention); supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text
(evaluating the US Supreme Court's decisions on detention authority abroad); supra
notes 53-72 and accompanying text (discussing the application of international law to
the United States' detention authority); supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text
(discussing the Alien Enemy Act of 1798); supra notes 93-102 (looking at US Supreme
Court decisions on detention authority within the United States); supra notes 103-124
and accompanying text (examining the Fourth Circuit's detention authority analysis in
the case of Al-Marri).
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23 6
norm for enemies to wear uniforms and be readily identifiable.
Terrorism moves between states and knows no national
borders.23 7 While the traditional framework analyzed by this Note
arguably authorizes the detention of foreign nationals as
suspected terrorists on US soil,238 that framework has developed
in a piecemeal fashion.23 9 The law as it has developed after
September 11 has been characterized by congressional or
executive action followed by judicial review. 2 o As such, the US
political branches may act in a way that each deems proper, but
the ground can shift underneath them when courts go back and
examine the foundations of their actions.2 41 While this Note
argues that military detention on US soil is authorized, it is on
ground that is no firmer than the ground on which Congress
stood when it passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the
MCA of 2006.242

236. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (distinguishing between lawful
enemy combatants and unlawful enemy combatants); see also supra note 140 and
accompanying text (discussing the US Supreme Court's reasoning in Quinin).
237. Al Qaeda is an unconventional enemy in the historical sense in that it is not
the enemy arm of a specific state. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 260 (4th Cir.
2008) (54 decision en banc) (Traxler, J., concurring) ("[W]hile [Al Qaeda] may be an
unconventional enemy force in a historical context, it is an enemy force nonetheless.").
238. See supra notes 86-124 and accompanying text (analyzing detention authority
on US soil).
239. See supra notes 24-72 and accompanying text (analyzing the basis for
detention authority abroad); see also supra notes 86-124 and accompanying text
(analyzing detention authority on US soil).
240. The executive branch began offshore detentions after September 11, and the
US Supreme Court responded with the Hamdi decision. Congress then enacted the
Detainee Treatment Act in response to Hamdi, and the Court responded with its
decision in Hamdan. Congress followed with the MCA of 2006, a provision of which the
Court struck down in Boumediene. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text (explaining that detention
authority has been left to the lower courts to refine); see also supra notes 125-29 (tracing
the development of the law leading up to the Boumediene decision).
242. See supra note 125 (discussing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005); see also
supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text (discussing the US Supreme Court's decision
in Boumediene).
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Military Detention and Trial Before a Military Commission are
Authorized under ExistingLaw

Under current law, the military may detain on US soil
foreign nationals who are suspected to be terrorists.2 43 The US
Constitution gives both Congress and the president war-making
powers.24 4 Using its power to make laws and declare war,
Congress has authorized the president to detain foreign
nationals suspected to be terrorists. 245 This power is not limited
to use abroad but also extends to US soil.246 Indeed, if the AUMF
does not authorize the president to detain those like the
September 11 hijackers, then the AUMF does nothing to prevent
such tragedies.24 7
US Supreme Court precedent in Quirin authorizes a military
commission trial for a foreign national in the United States who
is an unprivileged enemy combatant.2 48 More recently, Congress
has authorized trial by military commission for those charged
with terrorism-related crimes.249 This authorization is not limited
to trial of such persons abroad. 250 Bills such as those introduced
by Senators Graham and McCain further illustrate a continuing
willingness in Congress, at least among some, to shape special
rules and procedures for foreign nationals detained as suspected

243. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.A (discussing authorization for military
detention on US soil); discussion supra Part II.C (discussing the legality of trying a
foreign national suspected to be a terrorist before a military commission on US soil).
244. See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
245. See, e.g., supra notes 18, 35-38 and accompanying text (discussing the AUMF);
supra notes 39-52 and accompanying text (analyzing judicial interpretation of the
AUMF and the executive branch's detention authority abroad under the AUMF); supra
notes 87-92 and accompanying text (discussing the Alien Enemy Act); supra notes 93124 and accompanying text (analyzing precedent for detention authority on US soil).
246. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (analyzing the AUMF); see also
discussion supra Part II.A (discussing military detention authority on US soil).
247. See supra note 110 (discussing the government's position in a brief in AlMarri's case that Congress must have intended to authorize the detention of those like
Al-Marri).
248. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text (analyzing authority for
military commission trial in Quirin).
249. See supra notes 74-76, 141-44 and accompanying text (discussing the MCA of
2009).
250. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (explaining that the MCA of
2009 allows a military commission jurisdiction over any alien unprivileged enemy
belligerent).
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terrorists. 25 1 More recently, Congress again demonstrated that it
is in fact willing to control the issue.
B. Military Detention and Trial before a Military Commission on US
Soil Better Address the Concerns Unique to the "War-on-Terror"Context
1. Moving Beyond Guantinamo
Any discussion regarding proper trial venue must first
acknowledge the negative history associated with detentions in
the "war on terror." What is often lost in the fervor to try crimes
of terrorism before a military commission is a concern for the
detainees' rights that have been violated during their
detention.' Is it really possible to avoid Guantdnamo's legacy in
either system? 5' The Ghailani trial casts doubt, even among
those in favor of federal criminal trials, on the viability of the
Using military commissions, however,
civilian system. 5
essentially acknowledges the preference-if not the need-for
the more flexible rules and procedures unavailable in federal
court.15 6 Perhaps that is not so bad.
Despite Congress's transfer ban,"' bringing the foreign
nationals detained at Guantdnamo Bay to the United States is the
best option. This would allow the United States to finally close
the detention facilities at Guantinamo, a promise made two years
ago that has yet to come to fruition. 5 Closing Guantdnamo
should be a priority of the Obama administration and Congress,
as it is a focal point for the rights violations carried out in the

251. See supra notes 220-32 and accompanying text (analyzing Senator Graham's
and Senator McCain's 'bills).
252. See supra notes 5-8, 11 and accompanying text (describing the ban on
transfers of Guantinamo detainees to the United States and the Obama administration's
reaction to the ban).
253. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing Senator John McCain's
preference for the use of military commissions).
254. Some say that it is not. See supra notes 207, 210 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text (discussing the Ghailani trial
and its media aftermath). But see supra note 203 and accompanying text (stating that
Ghailani's conviction carries a sentence of between twenty years and life in prison);
supra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing praise for the Ghailani trial).
256. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 5-8, 11 and accompanying text (discussing the ban).
258. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing President Obama's order
to close Guantinamo).
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name of preventing terrorism.5 If national security is the most
pressing concern, closing Guantinamo addresses it because
Guantinamo costs lives. 2 6o Transferring the detainees to the
United States should not be just a possibility; it is a necessity.
Once Guantinamo no longer holds foreign nationals
"captured" in the "war on terror," the United States can move
beyond the Bush-and now the Obama-administration's years
of letting detainees languish at Guantinamo. After they are in
the United States, however, the next step should be to prosecute
them before military commissions. While a federal criminal trial
provides "gold medal justice,"2 6' it may not be possible to try
"war-on-terror" detainees in this system due to the continuing
legacy of Guantinamo and the questionable tactics used against
detainees during the Bush administration. 262 Those who can be
tried in the federal system, of course, should be, as few question
the legitimacy of those proceedings.2 " Trial before a military
commission should not be looked upon, however, as a failure. 264
The Obama administration should embrace military commissions
as an improvement upon the recent past 265 and seize the
opportunity to acknowledge that the government violated many

259. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (citing President Obama's assertion
that GuantAnamo is a recruiting tool for Al Qaeda).
260. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (stating that torture and abuse cost
American lives).
261. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (quoting Morris Davis, the former
chief prosecutor for military commissions).
262. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text (discussing Al-Marri's plea
deal); see also discussion supra Part II.E.3 (discussing the Ghailani trial).
263. See discussion supra Part II.D; see also discussion supra Part II.E.3 (discussing
the Ghailani trial). It is possible that some detainees will present the sensitive issues that
are better served by trial before a military commission. See, e.g., supra notes 145-55 and
accompanying text (discussing the procedures in place for trials before a military
commission); supra notes 184-93 and accompanying text (highlighting the debate over
how the Christmas Day Bomber should have been handled); supra notes 194-98 and
accompanying text (discussing concerns raised by trying Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in a
Manhattan federal courtroom); supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text
(highlighting the debate over which venue would best address security and procedural
concerns). Where trials would not present these issues, a federal criminal trial could
work. Even those trials that did present such an issue worked. See discussion supra Part
II.E.3.
264. But see supra note 145 and accompanying text (citing criticism of the military
commissions system).
265. See supra notes 145-65 and accompanying text (analyzing military
commissions after the enactment of the MCA of 2009).
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detainees' rights. 266 Use of the commissions to prosecute
terrorism can be viewed as a necessary apology for the last few
years and an impetus to do better in the future. Trials before a
military commission are, in reality, the only option for many of
the detainees still in custody at Guantinamo that strikes a
balance between the need to legitimize the continued detention
of those too dangerous to release and the need to redeem the
United States' reputation among its allies.
2.

Beginning on US Soil

Because the "war on terror" is likely to continue both before
and after the closure of the detention facilities at Guantinamo, it
is also necessary to address the question of how to detain and try
foreign nationals suspected of terrorism on US soil going
forward.26 1 On US soil, initially, military detention of a foreign
national suspected to be a terrorist may provide the better option
for addressing the sensitive security and procedural concerns
unique to the "war-on-terror" context 269 and may better address
intelligence-gathering needs, assuming the detention is the result
of an imminent or immediately thwarted attack. Terrorist attacks
are often the result of planning and coordination, and, as seen in
the controversy surrounding the questioning of Abdulmutallab, it
is important to get information about co-conspirators in order to
prevent subsequent harm. 270 The Miranda warnings required in

266. See supra notes 201, 210-11 and accompanying text (illuminating the
difficulties created in federal court by evidence gained through enhanced interrogation
techniques).
267. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (citing Goldsmith); see also
discussion supra Part II.C.3 (discussing military commissions in relation to the
requirements of the Geneva Conventions).
268. See, e.g., discussion supra Part II.E.1 (discussing Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
who attempted to ignite a bomb on an airplane over Detroit in December, 2009).
269. See, e.g., supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text (discussing the
procedures in place for trials before a military commission); supra notes 184-93 and
accompanying text (highlighting the debate over how the Christmas Day Bomber should
have been handled); supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text (discussing concerns
raised by trying Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in a Manhattan federal courtroom); supra
notes 208-15 and accompanying text (highlighting the debate over which venue would
best address security and procedural concerns).
270. See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of
Abdulmutallab's interrogation on the grounds that the need for immediate intelligencegathering was not properly addressed).
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the civilian system can cause a suspect to "go silent." 271 While
Miranda rights are a tenet of the American criminal justice
system,272 the war-like context of terrorism, even on American
soil,273 cannot be ignored.274 Less immediate threats can be
addressed in the civilian criminal justice system.27 5
Going forward, federal criminal trials would become more
feasible, depending on the circumstances surrounding pre-trial
detention.27 6 Concerns about torture behind closed doors should
be alleviated now that detainees are protected from enhanced
interrogation techniques and other questionable treatment.27 7 As
discussed above, trial before a military commission on US soil is
also a lawful and appropriate option,2 78 should it be necessary,
but it is difficult to provide a persuasive reason why a civilian
criminal trial would not be the preferred option.27 9 After all, a
criminal trial in federal court unquestionably satisfies the Geneva
Conventions. 28 0 Trial before a military commission as constituted
under the MCA of 2009, however, would satisfy the Geneva
Conventions as well.281

271. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (stating that Abdulmutallab
went silent after being read his Miranda rights and questioning the wisdom of the
decision to inform him of those rights).
272. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (explaining the Mirandarule).
273. See supra notes 103-24 and accompanying text (analyzing the Fourth Circuit's
opinion in AI-Marri).
274. See supra note 234 and accompanying text ("A war is a war. A war is not a
crime, and you don't bring your enemies to a courthouse."); see also supra notes 35-43
and accompanying text (discussing the AUMF and judicial interpretation of the AUMF).
275. See discussion supra Part II.D (discussing detention and trial in the civilian
criminal justice system).
276. The evidentiary issues that follow detainees who have been subjected to
enhanced interrogation techniques or who were captured and held under questionable
circumstances should not become an issue for foreign nationals detained on US soil in
the future. See discussion supra Parts II.D, II.E.3.
277. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text (stating that the use of
enhanced interrogation techniques is now prohibited).
278. See discussion supra Part lI.C (discussing the military commissions system).
279. But see discussion supra Parts II.E.1-4 (discussing criticism of the use of civilian
criminal trials).
280. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text (stating that a federal criminal
trial surpasses the requirements of the Geneva Conventions).
281. See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text (analyzing the MCA of 2009 in
the context of the Geneva Conventions).
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CONCLUSION
While both options discussed in this Note are viable and
legal, they are just that: options. This Note stresses the
importance of closing the detention facilities at Guantinamo and
transferring those that remain in military custody there to the
United States. If the foreign nationals currently detained
pursuant to the "war on terror" are brought from Guantinamo
to the United States, this Note proposes that military
commissions should not be seen as a failure but, rather,
embraced as an acknowledgement that decisions made in the
past were flawed. The civilian criminal justice system, however,
should be the standard. Unless the US Supreme Court holds
otherwise, Congress and the president can limit the available
options for detention and trial. The US Supreme Court's case
history suggests that it may continue to defer to the political
branches' judgment on these issues, provided that those
branches make a concerted effort to comply with the norms of
American justice.

